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Abstract
We investigate the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems from the per-
spective of cooperative game theory and Broomean theories of fairness. Paseau and
Saunders (Utilitas 27:460–469, 2015) proved that no non-trivial theory of fairness
can be aggregative and conclude that theories of fairness are therefore problematic,
or at least incomplete. We observe that there are theories of fairness, particularly
those that are based on cooperative game theory, that do not face the problem of
non-aggregativity. We use this observation to argue that the universal claim that no
non-trivial theory of fairness can guarantee aggregativity is false. Paseau and
Saunders’s mistaken assertion can be understood as arising from a neglect of the
(cooperative) games approach to fair division. Our treatment has two further pay-
offs: for one, we give an accessible introduction to the (cooperative) games
approach to fair division, whose significance has hitherto not been appreciated by
philosophers working on fairness. For another, our discussion explores the issue of
aggregativity in fair division problems in a comprehensive fashion.
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1 Introduction
When our collective needs exceed the resources available, or when what is there is less
than what is demanded, a fair division problem arises: how, in order to be fair, should a
scarce good be divided? Take, for instance, the following fair division problem.
Problem I John owes £80 to Ann and £40 to Bob but has only £60 left.
How then, in order to be fair, must John divide the £60 that he has left between Ann
and Bob? A popular answer, advocated for by John Broome (1990), is that John
must divide the £60 proportional to the claims of Ann and Bob. As Ann and Bob
have claims of £80 and £40 respectively, a proportional division of £60 results in the
allocation (40, 20) in which Ann receives £40 and Bob £20. Now suppose that Ann
and Bob are also involved in a further fair division problem:
Problem II Jack owes £40 to Ann and £80 to Bob but has only £90 left.
Again, let us suppose that Jack divides the £90 that he has left proportional to the
claims of Ann and Bob, so that the allocation (30, 60) results, in which Ann receives
£30 and Bob £60.
Thus, by applying the proportional rule to Problem I and Problem II, Ann
receives an aggregate amount of (40 þ 30 ¼) £70 whereas Bob receives an
aggregate amount of (20 þ 60 ¼) £80: the aggregated allocation that results from
applying the proportional rule to both problems is (70, 80).
To the extent to which dividing fairly comes down to applying the proportional rule, the
allocations (40, 20) and (30, 60) that result from applying the proportional rule to
Problem I and Problem II are fair allocations. But by applying the proportional rule to
Problem I and Problem II one also realises the aggregated allocation (70, 80). And so
when dividing fairly comes down to applying the proportional rule, by extension the
aggregated allocation (70, 80) must also be considered fair.
In a recent paper, Paseau and Saunders (2015) have argued that the aggregated
allocation (70, 80) that results from applying the proportional rule to the above two
problems is unfair. In a nutshell, their argument runs as follows. The aggregated
amount that has to be divided is (60 þ 90 ¼) £150 with aggregated claims of Ann
and Bob equal to (80 þ 40 ¼) £120 and (40 þ 80 ¼) £120, respectively. As Ann
and Bob have equal (aggregated) claims, fairness in general, and the proportional
rule in particular, require that they receive equal (aggregated) amounts. As the
aggregated allocation that results from applying the proportional rule to Problem I
and Problem II is (70, 80), that allocation is unfair: Ann is getting too little and Bob
is getting too much. The above example illustrates that the proportional rule is not
aggregative. As Paseau and Saunders (2015: 460) put it, this means that the
proportional rule is subject to the problem of non-aggregativity: ‘Two transactions,
each of which is fair in isolation, may produce an aggregate result which would be
judged as unfair had it resulted from a single distribution.’
To hold that fair division comes down to applying the proportional rule is to
adopt a particular theory of fairness. Thus, someone who seeks to escape the
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problem of non-aggregativity may attempt to do so by adopting another theory of
fairness. According to Paseau and Saunders, any such attempt is bound to fail as any
(non-trivial)1 theory of fairness is non-aggregative: the pivotal claim that supports
their philosophical discussion of aggregativity is NAT.
NAT There is no (non-trivial) aggregative theory of fairness.
According to Paseau and Saunders, NAT means that any theory of fairness is
subject to the problem of non-aggregativity. Hence, such theories ‘are all to that
extent problematic, or at least incomplete’ (2015: 468). Moreover, they hold that
NAT’s ‘significance has not hitherto been appreciated by philosophers working on
fairness’ (2015: 461).
In this paper, we show that NAT is false. We do so by exploring different kinds
of theories of fairness. We introduce the claims approach and the games approach
to fair division and explain that both approaches can be used to model fair division
problems such as Problem I and II. Ever since Broome’s seminal paper on fairness
(Broome 1990), fair division problems are modelled as claims problems in the
philosophical literature (see Hooker 2005; Saunders 2010; Tomlin 2012; Curtis
2014 or Piller 2017 for an overview). However, by drawing on O’Neill (1982), we
observe that the very same fair division problems can also be modelled as
cooperative games. By doing so, solution values in cooperative game theory become
available to analyse fair division [e.g. the value of Shapley (1953), the nucleolus
(Schmeidler 1969), and the s-value of (Tijs 1981)].
Using the games approach, fair division problems can indeed be analysed
respecting aggregativity. Whereas the claims approach does not harbour any
aggregative theory of fairness, there are such theories on the games approach: as a
categorical statement,NAT is simply false. Paseau and Saunders’s mistaken assertion
ofNAT can thus be understood as arising from a neglect of the games approach to fair
division. Our exploration of aggregativity also has broader implications related to the
role of the games approach to fair division. We show that the games approach can
model any fair division problem that the claims approach can model, but not vice
versa. Moreover, not all division rules from the claims approach can be translated into
solution values in the games approach. These facts about the games and the claims
approach imply that fairness theorists make important methodological choices when
modeling fair division problems.
The paper is structured as follows.
In Sects. 2.1 and 2.2 we introduce the claims and the games approach to fair
division, respectively. We explain, in Sect. 2.3, that the theories of fairness
associated with these approaches act on different fairness structures and explain, in
terms of these fairness structures, what it means for a theory of fairness to be
aggregative. In Sect. 2.4 we discuss the Shapley value, which is an aggregative
theory of fairness that is associated with the games approach. Hence, the Shapley
value testifies that, as a categorical statement, NAT is false.
1 A theory of fairness is trivial if it allots nothing to each agent in each fair division problem.
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In Sect. 3.1 we introduce the run-to-the-bank (RTB) rule, which is a theory of
fairness associated with the claims approach. We then show, in Sect. 3.2, that with
respect to fair division problems such as Problem I and II above, the Shapley value
gives the same recommendations as the RTB rule. These theories of fairness thus
coincide on the recommendations, whereas they come apart with regards to
aggregativity. We explain, in Sect. 3.3, that this does not give rise to a paradox of
aggregativity, contrary to what one may think at first glance.
In Sect. 4 we explore in what way aggregativity is relevant for theories of fair
division. In Sect. 4.1 we revisit Problem I and II both in terms of the RTB rule and
the Shapley value and explain that certain conclusions with respect to these
problems are an artefact from adopting the claims approach to fair division. In
Sect. 4.2 we argue—without relying on the games approach - that even though no
theory of fairness associated with the claims approach is aggregative, that does not,
pace Paseau and Saunders, render such theories problematic. In Sect. 4.3 we
comment on the trade-offs related to adopting the games or claims approach to fair
division and on the role that aggregativity plays in that trade-off.
Finally, Sect. 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 There are Aggregative Theories of Fairness
2.1 The Claims Approach and Aggregativity
In analysing fair division problems such as Problem I and Problem II, Paseau and
Saunders adopt what we will call the claims approach to fair division. In the
philosophical literature, this approach has arguably started with John Broome’s
seminal paper on fairness (Broome 1990). Broomean theories of fairness focus on
those fair division problems in which some agents have claims to a good that is to be
distributed. Roughly, a claim is a specific type of reason, owed to the agent herself,
as to why she should have some of the good that is to be divided. A thorough
analysis of what is a claim is not to be found in the literature, but need, desert, and
promises are typically taken to induce claims. In the introduction, we also
(implicitly) analysed Problem I and Problem II as claims problems, the official
definition of which is as follows.
Claims problems A claims problem C :¼ ðE;N; cÞ consists of an amount of good
E 0, also called the estate, a set of receiving agentsN and a claims vector c specifying
the amount of the estate that agent i has a claim to (ci 0), and which is such that
together the claims exceed the amount of the good available (
P
i2N ciE).
Hence, on the claims approach, Problem I and Problem II are analysed as claims
problems CI and CII , respectively, where:
CI ¼ ð60; fA;Bg; ð80; 40ÞÞ CII ¼ ð90; fA;Bg; ð40; 80ÞÞ
We already discussed the proportional rule P, which is an example of a division
rule. More generally, a division rule is defined as follows.
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Division rules A division rule r is a function that maps each claims problem
(E, N, c) to an allocation x 2 RN , with the property that each agent receives a non-
negative amount that does not exceed his or her claim (0 xi ci), and the sum of
what is allocated does not exceed the estate (
P
i2N xiE).
This definition permits a multitude of different division rules, as it does make very
little specific demands on what the allocation should look like. Notably, this general
definition of a division rule does not even prescribe that such a rule is efficient,
which means it is not required that a division rule proposes to allocate all of the
estate. Indeed, the rule which allots 0 to each agent in each claims problem, call this
the trivial rule, respects the definition of a division rule. Clearly, the trivial rule is, in
sharp contrast to the proportional rule, a rather uninteresting division rule.
In the economic literature on fair division, claims problems and division rules are
studied extensively: see Thomson (2003) for an overview. Here, we just mention
one further example of a non-trivial division rule, the so-called constrained equal
losses rule (CEL rule). Given a claims problem (E, N, c), the CEL rule proposes an
efficient division of the estate E in such a way that each agent loses an equal amount
with respect to her claim, subject to the constraint that no agent loses more than her
claim.2 Applying the CEL rule to claims problem CI results in the allocation
(50, 10), so that both A and B lose an equal amount of 30 with respect to their claims
of 80 and 40, respectively. Also, applying the CEL rule to claims problem CII results
in the allocation (25, 65) so that both agents lose 15 with respect to their respective
claims.
Given any two claims problems C ¼ ðE;N; cÞ and C0 ¼ ðE0;N; c0Þ that involve the
same set of agents N, by aggregating C and C0, i.e. by adding the estates and claims
vectors of C and C0, one obtains a further claims problem
C þ C0 :¼ ðE þ E0;N; cþ c0Þ, which is then called the aggregated problem of C
and C0. For example, by aggregating claims problems CI and CII one obtains the
aggregated problem CI þ CII which we will also denote as CIþII :
CIþII ¼ ð150; fA;Bg; ð120; 120ÞÞ
In the introduction, we informally demonstrated that the proportional rule P is not
aggregative with respect to CI and CII , meaning that:
PðCIÞ þ PðCIIÞ 6¼ PðCIþIIÞ
In contrast, the CEL rule is aggregative with respect to CI and CII , as
CELðCIÞ þ CELðCIIÞ ¼ CELðCIþIIÞ
In order for a division rule r to be aggregative, it has to be aggregative with respect
to any two claims problems C ¼ ðE;N; cÞ and C0 ¼ ðE0;N; c0Þ that involve the same
set of agents. That is, r is aggregative just in case for any such C and C0 we have:
2 Thus according to the CEL rule, agent i receives xi ¼ maxf0; ci  kg, where k is chosen such thatP
i2N xi ¼ E.
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rðCÞ þ rðC0Þ ¼ rðC þ C0Þ ð1Þ
The trivial rule that was discussed above is clearly an aggregative, albeit an unin-
teresting, division rule. Claims problems CI and CII testify that the proportional rule
is not aggregative. But what about the CEL rule, is it aggregative? It follows from
Theorem 1 below that the answer is ‘no’, as there are no non-trivial aggregative
division rules.
Theorem 1 (There are no non-trivial aggregative division rules)
Proof See ‘‘Appendix’’. h
Paseau and Saunders (2015) prove Theorem 1 themselves but remark that ‘there
is an extensive and sophisticated economics literature in this area which appears to
imply [Theorem 1]’. Their presumption is definitely correct as a proof of Theorem 1
can also be found in Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001: 227).3 Bergantin˜os and
Me´ndez-Naya’s result has led to some interesting studies of ‘aggregativity in claims
problems’ in the economic literature4, which is not directly relevant for our
purposes here (but see Sect. 4).
What is directly relevant for our purposes here is the philosophical upshot of
Theorem 1. According to Paseau and Saunders, Theorem 1 implies NAT.
NAT There is no non-trivial aggregative theory of fairness.
The reason that Paseau and Saunders take Theorem 1 to imply NAT is simply that
they equate theories of fairness with division rules. Although it makes sense to do so
on the claims approach to fair division, that is not the only approach. In the next
section, we will discuss another framework for fair division, which we call the
games approach, that can also be used to analyse fair division problems such as
Problem I and Problem II. In order to analyse such problems, the games approach
does not model them as claims problems, but rather as cooperative games. On the
claims approach, theories of fairness are division rules that act on claims problem
but, as we will see, on the games approach theories of fairness are solution values
that act on cooperative games: theories of fairness on the claims and games
approach act on different fairness structures. On the claims approach, there are no
(non-trivial) aggregative theories of fairness, but on the games approach there are
such theories. Indeed, as a categorical statement, NAT is simply false, as we will
explain in the remainder of this section.
2.2 A First Look at the Games Approach
Let us consider Problem I once more and observe the following. If John would fully
repay Bob there is still 60  40 ¼ £20 left for Ann, which is to say that Ann can
guarantee herself £20. When John does his utmost to fully reimburse Ann, he has to
3 Actually, our proof of Theorem 1 is adapted from Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001).
4 See e.g. Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001); Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2006), and Alcalde et al.
(2014)
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give her £60 leaving nothing for Bob, which is to say that Bob can guarantee
himself £0. Now consider the group consisting of Ann and Bob. If all receiving
agents other than Ann and Bob (of which there are none) are fully reimbursed, there
is £60 left for Ann and Bob together: the group consisting of Ann and Bob can
guarantee itself £60. We have now implicitly analysed Problem I as a cooperative
game, the definition of which is as follows.
Cooperative games A cooperative game is a pair (N, v), with N a set of agents and
with v : PðNÞ ! Rþ, vð;Þ ¼ 0 the characteristic function of the game which
specifies the value that each group of agents (or coalition) can guarantee itself.5 In
particular, v(N) represents the value that the grand coalition N can guarantee itself.
Thus, the cooperative games that are associated with Problem I and Problem II are
given by ðfA;Bg; vIÞ and ðfA;Bg; vIIÞ respectively, where:
vIð;Þ ¼ 0 vIðfAgÞ ¼ 20 vIðfBgÞ ¼ 0 vIðfA;BgÞ ¼ 60
vIIð;Þ ¼ 0 vIIðfAgÞ ¼ 10 vIIðfBgÞ ¼ 50 vIIðfA;BgÞ ¼ 90
One central question that is studied by cooperative game theory is the following.
Given a game ðN; vÞ; how to divide vðNÞ amongst the agents in N? ð2Þ
Note that the money that is to be divided in Problem I and Problem II is, per
definition, the value of the ‘grand coalition’ (the group of all agents, i.e. in this case,
Ann and Bob together) in the associated games vI and vII , respectively. Hence, an
answer to question (2) can resolve fair division problems such as Problem I and
Problem II, as discussed in more detail in Sect. 2.3. In the literature on cooperative
game theory, question (2) is answered by specifying a solution value.
Solution values A solution value u is a function that maps each cooperative game
(N, v) to an allocation x 2 RN with the property that Pi2N xi vðNÞ.
There is an extensive literature in cooperative game theory that proposes and compares
different solution values and all of them can be—and typically are—understood as
proposals to divide the value of the grand coalition fairly. Prominent solution values that
have been proposed in the literature are theShapley value (cf. Shapley 1953), thenucleolus
(cf. Schmeidler 1969), and the s-value (cf. Tijs 1981). We will revisit the Shapley value in
some detail later on and apply it to vI and vII . However, it will be instructive to first spend a
few words on the notions of a theory of fairness and a fairness structure.
2.3 Fairness: Theories, Structures, and Aggregation
Let us revisit Problem I once more, in which John owes £80 to Ann, £40 to Bob but
has only £60 left. We have seen that there are two different ways to divide the £60
in this fair division problem. One way is to analyse Problem I as claims problem CI
5 PðNÞ is the powerset of N, i.e. the set of all subsets of N.
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and then to apply a division rule to CI in order divide the £60. The other way is to
analyse Problem I as cooperative game vI and then to apply a solution value to vI in
order to do so. To be sure, the availability of these two approaches is not confined to
Problem I. Indeed, any fair division problem that can be analysed as a claims
problem C ¼ ðE;N; cÞ can also be analysed as a cooperative game6 ðN; vCÞ, where
vCðSÞ ¼ maxf0;E 
X
i62S
cig for each S  N: ðHÞ
Note that the estate E in claims problem C coincides with the value of the grand
coalition vCðNÞ in the game that is associated with C via (H). Hence, division rules
and solution values provide two different ways to divide E ¼ vCðNÞ.
Paseau and Saunders equate theories of fairness with division rules, which makes
sense from the perspective of the claims approach. However, from the perspective of
the games approach, it makes just as much sense to equate a theory of fairness with a
solution value. By a theory of fairness, we mean a function that assigns an allocation of
the good-to-be-divided for each fairness structure that is within its domain. A fairness
structure is obtained by modelling a fair division problem, that is by extracting the
characteristics of the problem on the basis of which, according to the model, fair
division should proceed. Thus, the fairness structures associated with the claims
approach are claims problems whereas the fairness structures associated with the
games approach are cooperative games. Both division rules and solution values are
theories of fairness, albeit theories that take different fairness structures as their input.
Although our notions of theory of fairness and of fairness structure are abstract,
they are theoretically fruitful. For one thing, they allow us to spell out the notion of
an aggregative theory of fairness in a way that does not privilege the claims or
games approach to fairness.
Aggregative Theories of Fairness A theory of fairness ToF is called aggregative
when the following holds. Given any two fairness structures S1 and S2 that involve
the same set of receiving agents, the sum of the allocations that result from applying
ToF to S1 and S2 is equal to the allocation that results from applying ToF to the
fairness structure that results from aggregating S1 and S2.
We have seen how aggregation works on the claim approach in Sect. 2.1. To
aggregate claims problems C ¼ ðE;N; cÞ and C0 ¼ ðE0;N; c0Þ one adds the estates
and claims vectors of both problems and thus obtains the aggregated claims problem
C þ C0 ¼ ðE þ E0;N; cþ c0Þ. When we abstract away from the particular fairness
structures that are exploited by the claims approach, we may say that to aggregate
two fairness structures (that involve the same set of receiving agents) one adds—
component wise—all information of the two structures. From the more abstract
notion of aggregation thus arrived at, it readily follows how to aggregate fairness
structures on the games approach: to aggregate games (N, v) and ðN; v0Þ one adds,
6 The converse statement does not hold as shown in Heilmann and Wintein (2017). Hence in an
important sense, the scope of the games approach to fair division is broader than the scope of the claims
approach. For more details, see also Sect. 4.3.
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for each coalition S  N, its value in both problems and thus obtains the aggregated
game ðN; vþ v0Þ. As an example, by aggregating games ðN; vIÞ and ðN; vIIÞ that are
associated with Problem I and II, respectively, we obtain7 the aggregated game
ðN; vIþIIÞ, where:
vIþIIð;Þ ¼ 0 vIþIIðfAgÞ ¼ 30 vIþIIðfBgÞ ¼ 50 vIþIIðfA;BgÞ ¼ 150
The definition of an aggregative solution value now readily follows from the general
definition of an aggregative theory of fairness. A solution value u is said to be
aggregative with respect to games (N, v) and ðN; v0Þ when:
uðN; vÞ þ uðN; v0Þ ¼ uðN; vþ v0Þ ð3Þ
A solution value u is aggregative when u is aggregative with respect to any pair of
cooperative games that involve the same set of agents N, i.e. u is aggregative when
(3) holds for any games (N, v) and ðN; v0Þ.
The trivial solution value, i.e. the solution value that assigns 0 to each agent in
each cooperative game, is a rather uninteresting example of an aggregative solution
value. The question arises whether there are also non-trivial aggregative solution
values, i.e. whether the games approach harbours non-trivial aggregative theories of
fairness. As we will explain in the next section, the Shapley value testifies that the
answer to that question is ‘yes’.
2.4 The Shapley Value and the Failure of NAT
Let us illustrate the Shapley value by showing how the Shapley values for vI and vII ,
the games associated with Problem I and Problem II as described in Sect. 2.2, are
obtained. For the sake of convenience, let us first display these games once more.
vIð;Þ ¼ 0 vIðfAgÞ ¼ 20 vIðfBgÞ ¼ 0 vIðfA;BgÞ ¼ 60
vIIð;Þ ¼ 0 vIIðfAgÞ ¼ 10 vIIðfBgÞ ¼ 50 vIIðfA;BgÞ ¼ 90
Given a cooperative game (N, v), the Shapley value considers all orders of the agents
in N. As vI and vII only involve two agents, A and B, there are just two such orders in
these games: hA;Bi and hB;Ai respectively. Agent orders may be thought of as
possible manners in which the grand coalition, consisting of all agents, can be formed.
So in the order hA;Bi, agent A is the first to arrive and thereby realises the singleton
coalition fAg. Next B arrives and he joins A to form the grand coalition fA;Bg. The
Shapley value records, for each order, themarginal contributions that the agents make
with respect to the coalitions that are formed upon their arrival. Consider the order
hA;Bi for vI . When A arrives, she realises a marginal contribution of vIðfAgÞ 
vIð;Þ ¼ 20  0 ¼ 20 with respect to the empty coalition. Then B arrives and he
realises a marginal contribution of vIðfA;BgÞ  vIðfAgÞ ¼ 60  20 ¼ 40 with
respect to coalition fAg. So, in vI , the marginal contributions of A and B induced by
hA;Bi are 20 and 40, respectively.According to the Shapley value, agents receive their
7 We will write vIþII as convenient shorthand for vI þ vII .
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average marginal contribution over all agent orders. As the reader may care to verify,
the order hB;Ai in vI induces marginal contributions for A and B of 60 and 0,
respectively. Hence the Shapley value for vI allots 20þ60
2
¼ 40 to A and 40þ0
2
¼ 20 to B:
ShðvIÞ ¼ ð40; 20Þ. Table 1 below conveniently summarises the computation of the
Shapley value for vI and also presents this computation for vII .
Given an arbitrary cooperative game (N, v), let us write PðNÞ to denote the set of
all orders of the agents in N and, given such an order p, let MCvðpÞ denote the
vector that records the marginal contributions that the agents realize in order p on
the basis of v. The general definition of the Shapley value can then be stated as
follows.8
ShðN; vÞ ¼
P
p2PðNÞMC
vðpÞ
j N j ! ð4Þ
From this definition of the Shapley value, it can readily be shown that the Shapley
value is aggregative, as recorded by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Sh is aggregative: ShðN; vÞ þ ShðN; v0Þ ¼ ShðN; vþ v0Þ
Proof See appendix. h
Theorem 2 testifies that NAT, when taken as a categorical statement, is simply
false. Indeed, the Shapley value is a (non-trivial) theory of fairness that is
aggregative.
2.5 Aggregativity After the Failure of NAT
In demonstrating that NAT is false, pacePaseau and Saunders (2015), we have
achieved a narrow, but important, argumentative goal. In the remainder of the paper,
we turn to discussing questions of broader significance that are implied by what we
have demonstrated. These questions are, on the one hand, raised by the strategy we
adopted to show that NAT is false. On the other hand, the very fact that NAT is
false needs evaluation in terms of its implications for Paseau and Saunders (2015)
and beyond. There are two issues.
Table 1 Shapley values for vI
and vII
Order MCA MCB Order MCA MCB
hA;Bi 20 40 hA;Bi 10 80
hB;Ai 60 0 hB;Ai 40 50
ShðvIÞ 40 20 ShðvIIÞ 25 65
8 Axiomatically, the Shapley value can be characterised as the only solution value that satisfies the
following four properties (cf. Shapley 1953): Efficiency (for each game (N, v), the Shapley value proposes
an allocation x such that
P
xi ¼ vðNÞ), Null player (for each game (N, v), the Shapley value proposes an
allocation x that allots 0 to each player whose marginal contribution to each coalition in which she is not
contained (including ;) is 0), Symmetry (for each game (N, v), the Shapley value proposes an allocation
x that gives the same amount to each pair of players whose marginal contribution to each coalition which
they are not contained in is the same), and Aggregativity.
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Firstly, we have introduced the claims and the games approach to modelling and
analysing fair division. These two approaches clearly differ in a number of
important respects, not least that there are aggregative theories of fairness on the
games approach, but not on the claims approach. Yet, we have also seen that the two
approaches are closely related in some other respects. Recall the equation (H) which
shows how any fair division problem that can be modelled as a claims problem can
also be modelled as a game. This suggests that there could be more similarities
between the two approaches. Indeed, as we will see, there exist division rules and
solution values that give the very same recommendations. We will explore the
potential tension between these kinds of similarities and differences between the
claims and games approach. This, in turn, allows us to make the nature and scope of
the aggregativity condition much more precise. We will do so in Sect. 3.
Secondly, we will investigate what kind of role aggregativity should play in
theorising about fair division. We will argue that aggregativity is not a property of
fairness, and that non-aggregative theories of fairness are not problematic. That is,
the proponent of the claims approach might face the choice between giving up
aggregativity or the claims approach in favour of the games approach. Contrary to
what Paseau and Saunders (2015) say, non-aggregativity should thus not be viewed
as a problem, or so we argue in Sect. 4.
Together, exploring these issues will yield a comprehensive treatment of
aggregativity in the claims approach and in the games approach.
3 Aggregativity in the Claims and Games Approach: No Paradox
We have already seen that there are two approaches to fair division. But what
exactly is their relation? Are they mutually exclusive or complementary? Do they
always offer differing analyses of aggregativity? Here, we will turn to answering
these questions. Sect. 3.1 introduces the run-to-the-bank (RTB) rule, a theory of
fairness associated with the claims approach, i.e. a division rule. In Sect. 3.2 we
show that the RTB-rule coincides with the Shapley value in the following sense: for
each claims problem C, the RTB rule prescribes the same allocation as the Shapley
value does for the game vC that is associated with C via (H). According to
Theorem 1, there are no aggregative division rules, and so the RTB rule is not
aggregative. Hence, the RTB rule and Shapley value are two theories of fairness that
coincide in their recommendations, yet come apart in terms of aggregativity.
Theories that both coincide and come apart...does that mean there is a paradox of
aggregativity? In Sect. 3.3 we explain why there is no such paradox. Moreover, later
in Sect. 4, we will show that the close relation between the RTB rule and Shapley
value can be invoked in a fruitful way: to explain why the claims and games
approach fare differently with respect to aggregativity.
3.1 The Run-to-the-Bank Rule
We will illustrate the run-to-the-bank (RTB) rule by showing how the RTB
allocations for CI ¼ ð60; fA;Bg; ð80; 40ÞÞ and CII ¼ ð90; fA;Bg; ð40; 80ÞÞ, the
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claims problems associated with Problem I and Problem II respectively, are
obtained.
Given a claims problem C ¼ ðE;N; cÞ, the RTB rule considers all orders of the
agents in N. Such an order is thought of as corresponding with a bank run, where all
claimants ‘run’ to an institution that is responsible for allocating the estate. When an
agent arrives at the bank in a given run he receives the minimum of (i) his claim and
(ii) the estate that is left after reimbursement of the agents that arrived earlier in the
run. Consider run hA;Bi in claims problem CI . The first agent to arrive at the bank is
A. Although A’s claim is 80, when she arrives the (remaining) estate is only 60 so
this 60 is what she receives. When B arrives next, there is nothing left so that B
receives 0 at his arrival. Thus, the run hA;Bi in CI results in pay-offs to A and B of
60 and 0, respectively. Similarly, as the reader may care to verify, in CI the run
hB;Ai results in pay-offs to A and B of 20 and 40, respectively. According to the
RTB rule, agents receive their average pay-offs (PO) over all runs. Thus, the RTB
allocation for CI allots 60þ20
2
¼ 40 to A and 0þ40
2
¼ 20 to B. Table I below
conveniently summarises the computation of the RTB allocation9 for CI and also
presents this computation for CII .
A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the RTB rule and Shapley value
recommend the same allocations for both Problem I and Problem II. In the next
subsection we explain that and why this is no coincidence.
3.2 How the RTB Rule and Shapley Value Coincide
In Sect. 2.3 we explained that any fair division problem that can be analysed as a
claims problem C can also be analysed as a cooperative game vC, where
vCðSÞ ¼ maxf0;E 
X
i62S
cig for each S  N: ðHÞ
It may have struck the reader that this means that a solution value u gives rise to a
division rule. For the estate in a claims problem C can be divided by applying u to
the game vC that is associated with C. Hence any solution value u specifies, albeit
via a detour through vC, how to divide the estate in a claims problem C. Solution
values implicitly define division rules. And so, in particular the Shapley value
implicitly defines a division rule which, as the following theorem attests, coincides
with the RTB rule.
Theorem 3 For any claims problem C: RTBðCÞ ¼ ShðvCÞ.
Proof See O’Neill (1982). h
Remember, from Sect. 3.1, that the RTB rule and Shapley value recommend the
same allocations for both Problem I and II:
9 Given an arbitrary claims problem (E, N, c), let us write PðNÞ to denote the set of all orders of the
agents in N and, given such an order p, let POðpÞ denote the vector that records the pay-offs that the
agents receive in that order. Then RTBðE;N; cÞ ¼
P
p2PðNÞ POðpÞ
jNj! .
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RTBðCIÞ ¼ ShðvIÞ; RTBðCIIÞ ¼ ShðvIIÞ ð5Þ
How are Theorem 3 and equation (5) related? Consider Problem I (the case of
Problem II is completely similar in this respect). Now, Theorem 3 indeed establishes
RTBðCIÞ ¼ ShðvCI Þ. But that does not establish what is said in (5). In particular,
Theorem 3 only relates CI to vCI , but (5) relates CI directly to vI . What is needed for
Theorem 3 to establish (5) is the additional assumption that vC
I ¼ vI . And, indeed,
that is the case: for Problem I, we can obtain the same game with two methods: one,
by modelling the fair division problem directly as the game vI ; two, by first mod-
elling the fair division problem as the claims problem CI , and then inducing the
game vC
I
from the claims problem, via (H). Now, although vC
I ¼ vI , it is important
to realise that the methods by which they are obtained are conceptually different. To
wit, method two does presuppose the claims approach, whereas method one does
not.
As we have just seen, vI is not induced from CI via (H), but it is identical to the
game that is induced as such, viz. vI ¼ vCI . It will be fruitful—as will be apparent
later—to call this relation between CI and vI that of relatedness H . In general, a
claims problem C and a cooperative game w are related H , denoted CHw, just in
case w is identical to the game that is induced by C in accordance with (H), i.e. just
in case w ¼ vC. Trivially then, CHvC for any claims problem C. Figure 1
conveniently summarizes the present discussion.
Table 2 RTB allocations for CI
and CII Run POA POB Run POA POB
hA;Bi 60 0 hA;Bi 40 50
hB;Ai 20 40 hB;Ai 10 80
RTBðCIÞ 40 20 RTBðCIIÞ 25 65
Fig. 1 Problem I and the relations between the claims and the games approach.
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Figure 1 shows that CI and vI are representations of Problem I associated with the
claims and games approach respectively, that vC
I
is induced by CI via (H), that vI (is
not so induced but) is identical to vC
I
, and hence that CI HvI .
The RTB rule and Shapley value thus coincide in the sense of Theorem 3. At the
same time, they come apart in terms of aggregativity. Prima facie, these relations
between the RTB rule and the Shapley value may seem strange or even paradoxical.
In the next section we will explain, by relying on the notion of relatedness H , that
in fact they are not: there is no paradox of aggregativity.
3.3 No Paradox of Aggregativity
Why is there no paradox of aggregativity? That is, why is there no conflict between
Theorem 3 and the fact that the Shapley value is, whereas the RTB rule is not,
aggregative? In a nutshell, the answer is that relatedness H is not preserved under
aggregation. Let us unpack this dense answer. We say that relatednessH is
preserved under aggregation, just in case, for any claims problems C and C0 and
games w and w0, (6) is true:
If CHw and C0 Hw0 then C þ C0 H wþ w0 ð6Þ
Now if relatednessH were preserved under aggregation, there would be a paradox
of aggregativity. For if relatednessH were preserved under aggregation, we could
easily establish that, as the Shapley value is aggregative and coincides with the RTB
rule (in the sense of Theorem 3), the RTB rule must be aggregative as well. The
argument for the aggregativity of the RTB rule would then run as follows, where C
and C0 are two arbitrary claims problems:
i. RTBðCÞ þ RTBðC0Þ ¼ ShðvCÞ þ ShðvC0 Þ (Theorem 3)
ii. ShðvCÞ þ ShðvC0 Þ ¼ ShðvC þ vC0 Þ (aggregativity of Sh)
iii. C þ C0 HvC þ vC0 (Theorem 3 and (6))
iv. ShðvC þ vC0 Þ ¼ RTBðC þ C0Þ (iii, Theorem 3)10
) RTBðCÞ þ RTBðC0Þ ¼ RTBðC þ C0Þ
The above argument makes precise the thought that ‘‘as the RTB rule coincides
with the Shapley value and as the Shapley value is aggregative, the RTB rule must
be aggregative as well’’, i.e. it makes precise the thought that there is a paradox of
aggregativity. By doing so, it also makes explicit the flaw inherent in that thought:
the assumption that relatednessH is preserved under aggregation, used in step iii in
the above argument. The fairness structures associated with Problem I and II
illustrate in concreto that relatednessH is not preserved under aggregation, as
indicated in the below figure.
10 Note that it immediately follows from Theorem 3 that RTBðCÞ ¼ ShðwÞ whenever wHC.
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The first lines of Fig. 2 were discussed in Sect. 3.2 and the interpretation of the
second line is completely similar to that of the first. The first two lines illustrate
respectively that CI and vI and that CII and vII are relatedH . The third line displays
the associated aggregated fairness structures CIþII and vIþII and shows that these are
not relatedH , as vC
IþII 6¼ vIþII . Indeed, we have that:
vC
IþII ð;Þ ¼ 0 vCIþII ðfAgÞ ¼ 30 vCIþII ðfBgÞ ¼ 30 vCIþII ðfA;BgÞ ¼ 150
vIþIIð;Þ ¼ 0 vIþIIðfAgÞ ¼ 30 vIþIIðfBgÞ ¼ 50 vIþIIðfA;BgÞ ¼ 150
There is thus no tension between Theorem 3 and the fact that the RTB rule and the
Shapley value come apart in terms of aggregativity: there is no paradox of
aggregativity. The tension is removed once it is realised that relatednessH is not
preserved under aggregation, as illustrated by Figure 2.
4 What Now for Aggregativity in Fair Division?
Aggregativity has proven to be a useful workhorse to compare different approaches
to fair division and, in particular, to learn about the games approach to fair division.
We now turn to re-focus the discussion on aggregativity. After having shown that
NAT is false and comparing the claims and the games approach, where do we stand
on the issue of aggregativity in fair division? We will argue that aggregativity is not
a property of fairness, and that non-aggregative theories of fairness are not
problematic. So, in light of the different approaches to fair division, it is best to
conceive of aggregativity as a condition that may or may not be applicable to certain
types of fair division problems.
4.1 Aggregativity on Different Fairness Structures
In the introduction, we saw that Paseau and Saunders use Problem I and II to
illustrate that the proportional rule is subject to the problem of non-aggregativity.
They argued that the aggregated allocation that results from applying the
Fig. 2 RelatednessH is not preserved under aggregation
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proportional rule to those problems11 is unfair: according to this aggregated
allocation, Ann receives less than Bob whereas fairness requires that they receive
equal amounts. In this section, we will explain that the thought that Ann and Bob
should receive equal aggregated amounts is an artefact of the claims approach.
Consider two fairness theorists, let us call them Saul and Melvin. Our theorists
agree that a theory of fairness should, ideally, be aggregative. However, they
disagree on how fair division problems should be modelled. Saul is strongly in
favour of the claims approach and his favourite theory of fairness is the RTB rule.
Melvin, however, is a proponent of the games approach and an advocate of the
Shapley value.
Now, Saul will analyse Problem I and II by adopting the claims approach to fair
division. For him, the fairness structures of Problem I and II are given by CI and CII
respectively. As he wants to respect aggregativity, the aggregated allocation that
results from applying his favourite division rule to Problem I and II must be equal to
the allocation that results from applying this rule to CIþII . Remember that Ann and
Bob have equal claims in the aggregated claims problem:
CIþII ¼ ð150; fA;Bg; ð120; 120ÞÞ
Fairness requires equal treatment of equals and Ann and Bob are equal from the
perspective of CIþII . Hence, any sensible division rule, thus also the RTB rule, must
recommend that Ann and Bob receive equal amounts on the basis of CIþII . And so it
follows from the above that Ann and Bob should receive equal amounts in the
aggregated allocation that results from applying the RTB rule (or any sensible
division rule) to Problem I and II. An aggregated allocation in which they do not
receive equal amounts is unfair. Hence, the aggregated allocation (65, 85) that
results from applying the RTB rule to Problem I and II is unfair.
Melvin, who adopts the games approach, analyses Problem I and II as follows.
The fairness structures associated with Problem I and II are given by vI and vII ,
respectively. Since he also assumes that a theory of fairness should be aggregative,
the aggregated allocation that results from applying his favourite solution value to
Problem I and II must be equal to the allocation that results from applying the
solution value to vIþII :
vIþIIð;Þ ¼ 0 vIþIIðfAgÞ ¼ 30 vIþIIðfBgÞ ¼ 50 vIþIIðfA;BgÞ ¼ 150
Observe that vIþII lays bare the fact that Bob has a larger aggregated guarantee value
than Ann does: vIþIIðfBgÞ[ vIþIIðfAgÞ. And so, from the perspective of vIþII , Ann
and Bob are not equals, which is reflected accordingly in the allocation of the
Shapley value. More generally, theories of fairness on the games approach take
guarantee values, as recorded by a cooperative game, as their input. For such a
theory it makes sense to allot Bob, who has the larger aggregated guarantee value, a
larger aggregated amount than Ann. From the perspective of the games approach it
makes perfect sense that Bob receives more than Ann. In particular, there is nothing
11 More precisely: from applying the proportional rule to the claims problems associated with those
problems.
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unfair about the aggregated allocation (65, 85) that results from applying the
Shapley value to Problem I and II.
Hence, the thought that Ann and Bob should receive equal aggregated amounts is
an artefact of the claims approach: only on the claims approach are Ann and Bob
‘‘equal’’ according to the structure that is obtained by aggregating the fairness
structures representing Problem I and II respectively. From Melvin’s perspective,
the aggregated allocation (65, 85), in which Ann and Bob receive unequal amounts,
is perfectly fair. But Saul is in a dilemma. For he should either give up his thought
that theories of fairness must be aggregative, or, if not, he should follow Melvin and
trade in the claims approach for the games approach. In Sect. 4.2 we will argue,
pace Paseau and Saunders, that even on the claims approach it is far from clear that
a non-aggregative theory of fairness is problematic. Section 4.3 is concerned with
the trade-off between the claims and games approach and the role that aggregativity
plays in that trade-off. Hence, Sects. 4.2 and 4.3 will guide Saul in resolving his
dilemma.
4.2 On the Problem of Non-aggregativity
Paseau and Saunders (2015: 460) maintain that a theory that is not aggregative is
subject to the problem of non-aggregativity: ‘Two transactions, each of which is fair
in isolation, may produce an aggregate result which would be judged as unfair had it
resulted from a single distribution.’ We will argue that it is far from clear that a non-
aggregative theory of fairness is problematic. We think that even on the claims
approach, Paseau and Saunders’s analysis of Problem I and II fails as an illustration
of the problematic character of non-aggregativity.
As we take the claims approach for granted here, there is no denying that
Problem I and II induce claims problems CI and CII , respectively. Further, there is no
denying the mathematical fact that CI þ CII ¼ CIþII . Yet, we will show that CIþII is
not induced by any relevant fair division problem. Hence, the recommendations of
one’s favourite theory of fairness for CIþII do not have any normative import for the
aggregated allocation that is realised by applying that theory to CI and CII ,
respectively. Hence, there is no problem of non-aggregativitiy.
To recap, the supposed problem of non-aggregativity is that the aggregated
recommendations for CI and CII are different from those for CIþII . Paseau and
Saunders maintain that this should not be so. They consider the fact that Ann and
Bob are both owed £120 whereas, in total, there is £150 left. We record this fact in
the following summary.
Summary I1II In total, Ann and Bob are both owed £120. In total, John and Jack
have £150 left.
Summary I?II is definitely a convenient global summary of some of the information
that is given in Problem I and II. But it is doubtful whether it makes sense to
represent Summary I?II as a genuine claims problem. Remember that a claims
problem consists of an estate with agents that have claims to certain amounts of that
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estate. Now John and Jack have, in total, £150 left and Ann and Bob are both owed
£120, but nothing in Summary I?II (nor in its underlying problems I and II)
prescribes that we have to interpret the £150 as a single estate, with Ann and Bob
having claims to receive £120 of that very estate. Whereas CI and CII clearly are
faithful models of Problem I and II, respectively, CIþII does not model any relevant
fair division problem. Hence, an appeal to CIþII in order to demonstrate the
problematic character of the aggregated allocation that results from applying one’s
favourite theory of fairness to CI and CII , is unsuccessful.
Interestingly, Paseau and Saunders (2015: 463) discuss and disqualify a response
to the problem of non-aggregativity that is related to the above discussion:
A response might be that the nature of the claims determines how they should
be met. If [Ann] is owed money by [John] and [Jack] separately, then they
should repay separately, whereas if the money is owed by [John] and [Jack]
together then they should repay collectively. But this response appears
unsatisfactory.12
Paseau and Saunders provide three reasons as to why they consider the response to
be unsatisfactory. We will discuss these reasons in turn and dismiss all of them.
Reason 1 is as follows:
First, it is intuitively unfair if Ann receives greater satisfaction than Bob
though they have equally strong claims to the same amount (albeit against
different debtors), so an adequate theory of fairness should be able to account
for this. Paseau and Saunders (2015: 463)
We submit that, pace Paseau and Saunders, fairness does not, neither intuitively nor
theoretically, dictate that two agents with equally strong claims to the same amount
should receive equal satisfaction. To see this, suppose that John has borrowed £120
from Ann and that Jack has borrowed £120 from Bob. When payment is due, John
has only £30 left whereas Jack has only £60 left. John and Jack use the money they
have left to pay off their creditors: John pays £30 to Ann so that Ann’s claim
receives 30
120
 100% ¼ 25% satisfaction and Jack pays £60 to Bob so that Bob’s
claim receives 60
120
 100% ¼ 50% satisfaction. Ann and Bob both have a claim to
£120, i.e. they have claims to the same amount, but there is nothing unfair about
these claims receiving unequal satisfaction. There is nothing fair about it either. For,
given the claims approach, the issue of fairness only arises when there are agents
with competing claims, i.e. claims of different agents to receive certain amounts of
the very same estate. In other words, the fact that agents have claims to the same
amount does not guarantee that these claims are part of a fair division problem. And
if they are not part of a fair division problem, it is not clear what to think of
assertions concerning the (un)fairness of the satisfaction of these claims. And so,
Reason 1 fails.
Reason 2 reads as follows.
12 We have adapted this quotation, and a further one below, to the slightly different notation in our
article. In Paseau and Saunders (2015), Ann = C1, and John = D and Jack = D.
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Second, Broome (1990: 92) defined claims as duties owed to particular
individuals, but he did not specify that they must be owed by particular
individuals. Thus, if Ann has a claim to £80 and a claim to £40, then Ann does
have a claim to £120, even if no single agent owes this amount to her. Paseau
and Saunders (2015: 463)
Now, Broome’s account of fairness deals with situations where ‘there are several
candidates to receive a good, but the good cannot be divided up to go round them
all’. The good in question may be very important, as when ‘not enough kidneys are
available for everyone who needs one’ (Broome 1990: 87). With respect to such fair
division problems, Broome (1990: 92) introduces the notion of a claim as follows.
...I shall first draw a distinction of a different sort amongst the reasons why a
candidate should get the good: some of these reasons are duties owed to the
candidate herself, and others are not. I shall call the former claims that the
candidate has to the good.
Thus Broome’s account of fairness deals with fair division problems in which some
scarce good (such as a number of kidneys or an amount of money) has to be divided
amongst several candidates. There are several types of reasons as to why an agent
should have some of the good (such as teleological reasons or side-constraints) in
such a problem and Broome argues that fairness is concerned with a specific type of
such reasons: claims. For Broome, a claim is thus defined relative to a fair division
problem, as a specific reason to give a candidate some of the good-to-be-divided in
the fair division problem under consideration. Paseau and Saunders neglect this
crucial feature of Broome’s account of fairness: they assume that claims are defined
in an absolute sense, irrespective of the specific fair division problems with respect
to which they are defined. Ann has a claim to £80 in fair division Problem I and a
claim to £40 in fair division Problem II but nothing in Broome (1990) or in his other
work on fairness mandates that we ascribe Ann a claim to receive £120 in a further
fair division problem.
Now, Paseau and Saunders observe, in Reason 2, that the claims approach does
not specify that claims are owed by particular individuals. We agree and note that
their observation immediately follows from an inspection of the definition of a
claims problem: whether or not there are individuals who own the estate is simply
not present in the definition of a claims problem. But what is present in the
definition of a claims problem, is that there are agents which all have claims to
receive some amount of the very same estate. Without competing claims that are
defined with respect to the same estate, there is, on the claims approach, no fair
division problem. As nothing in Summary I?II (nor in the underlying Problem I and
II) warrants that the amounts of £120 have to be interpreted as claims to a single
estate, Reason II also fails.
The above also answers Reason 3 by Paseau and Saunders:
Third, nothing in our schematic example specifies whether [John] ¼ [Jack] or
[John] 6¼ [Jack]. Paseau and Saunders (2015: 463)
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It may very well be the case that the estate of CI and the estate of CII are owned by
the same debtor, say John. The point is that CI and CII are models of different fair
division problems and that the claims of Ann and Bob are defined relative to these
fair division problems. Nothing that Paseau and Saunders (or Broome) tell us
warrants that claims that are defined relative to these fair division problems induce
claims that are defined relative to a further fair division problem.
In summary, our discussion shows that Saul, or any proponent of the claims
approach, may question the extent of the significance of the problem of non-
aggregativity. Whereas Paseau and Saunders are definitely correct that, on the
claims approach, there are no aggregative theories of fairness, we are not convinced
that this is problematic.
4.3 Aggregativity and the Trade-Off Between Claims and Games
In the previous section we showed that the arguments of Paseau and Saunders,
which purport to establish that the claims approach harbours a problem of non-
aggregativity by analysing Problem I and II, fail. Now, there could be other
arguments, spelled out in terms of fair division problems other than Problem I and
II, that establish that, after all, there is such a problem. Although that may be the
case, Sect. 4.2 establishes that Theorem 1 as such, i.e. the mathematical fact that
there are no (non-trivial) aggregative division rules, is far from sufficient to
establish a problem of non-aggregativity. Now, in the economic literature, where
Theorem 1 is already known since Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001), Theo-
rem 1 is not taken as reporting a problematic fact. When discussing the
aggregativity property for division rules, Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001:
225) describe the property of aggregativity as guaranteeing that two different
procedures for dividing an estate coincide. They do not describe aggregativity as
being required by fairness, as being intuitively appealing or desirable: although it
may be convenient to have two procedures available that give the same result,
fairness as such does not require that such procedures are available. Although we
concur with Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya’s assessment of Theorem 1, we realize
that there might be further arguments that establish that Theorem 1 points to a
problematic fact about theories of fairness on the claims approach. For argument’s
sake, let’s assume that this ‘might be’ turns out to be an ‘are’. Then, should Saul, or
any proponent of the claims approach who thinks that theories of fairness should be
aggregative, trade in the claims approach for the games approach? Of course, given
Saul’s take on aggregativity, the fact that the games approach harbours aggregative
theories of fairness provides a reason to favour the games over the claims approach.
But Saul may wonder whether there are there further reasons for, or against, trading
in the claims for the games approach to fairness. The best advice we can give Saul at
this point is to read (Heilmann and Wintein 2017), where the trade-off between the
claims and games approach is discussed in detail. Here, we can only mention two
important considerations that we think Saul should be aware of.
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R1. In favour of the games approach: broader scope. We already explained, in
Sect. 2.3, that the games approach has a scope that is at least as broad as the claims
approach: any fair division problem that can be analysed as a claims problem can
also be analysed as a cooperative game. In (Heilmann and Wintein 2017) however,
we show that there are fair division problems that cannot be properly analysed using
the claims approach whereas they are naturally represented as cooperative games.
Hence, the games approach to fairness has a scope that is strictly broader than that
of the claims approach, which may be a reason to favour the former over the latter.
According to Theorem 3, the RTB rule coincides with the Shapley value. This means
that for Saul, whose preferred theory of fairness is the RTB rule, trading in the RTB
rule for the Shapley value, and so the claims approach for the games approach, may
not be such a dramatic change. In fact, reason R1 and Saul’s take on aggregativity,
jointly constitute a clear rationale for Saul to adopt the Shapley value rather than the
RTB rule. But the preferred theory of fairness of a typical proponent of the claims
approach, say John Broome, is not the RTB rule but rather the proportional rule P.
For such a proponent, trading in the claims for the games approach is a more
dramatic change, as reason R2 explains.
R2. Against the games approach: unavailability of the proportional rule
13 The
proportional rule P is unavailable on the games approach: there is no solution value
u whatsoever that coincides with the proportional rule. That is, for no solution value
u we have that PðCÞ ¼ uðvCÞ for any claims problem C.14 And so, the costs of
trading in the claims for the games approach are definitely higher for a proponent of
P than for Saul, who favours the RTB rule.15
Whereas R1 and R2 state motivations to adopt the claims or games approach tout
court, an ‘‘all or nothing choice’’ for one of the approaches may not be the only
viable option for a fairness theorist. Indeed, her choice to adopt a particular
approach may be dependent on the nature of the fair division problem at hand. See
Heilmann and Wintein (2017) for more details.
5 Concluding Remarks
We discussed the claims and games approach to fair division and explained that
these approaches harbour theories of fairness that act on different fairness structures.
We explained that whereas there are no aggregative theories of fairness on the
claims approach, there are such theories on the games approach. More specifically,
13 Another context where the proportional rule is unavailable is when the good-to-be-divided comes in
indivisible units. What should a ‘‘Broomean fairness theorist’’, who is sympathetic to the slogan that
fairness consists of the proportional satisfaction of claims, do in such a context? See Wintein and
Heilmann (2018) for an elaborate answer to that question..
14 See Proposition 4 of Heilmann and Wintein (2017)
15 See Heilmann and Wintein (2017) for a detailed discussion of the relation between fairness and
proportionality on the games approach
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Theorem 2 testifies that the Shapley value is aggregative. Hence Paseau and
Saunders’s assertion of NAT—there are no aggregative theories of fairness—is
false. We revisited the problem of non-aggregativity in light of the failure of NAT,
by analysing fair division problems both on the claims approach (via the RTB rule)
and on the games approach (via the Shapley value). Even though the RTB rule
coincides with the Shapley value in the sense of Theorem 3 there is, perhaps
surprisingly, no paradox of aggregativity, as we explained in Sect. 3.3.
Our discussion has also allowed us to give an accessible introduction to the
games approach to fair division, whose significance has not hitherto been
appreciated by philosophers working on fairness. We have shown that the games
approach can model any fair division problem that the claims approach can model,
but not vice versa. (cf. equation (H) in Sect. 2.3). Moreover, not all division rules
from the claims approach can be translated into solution values in the games
approach, the proportional rule being a case in point (cf. Reason R2 in Sect. 4.3).
Fairness theorists thus make important methodological choices when they decide in
which approach to model fair division problems. Indeed, we also explained that
certain conclusions that Paseau and Saunders draw are an artefact of their adopting
the claims approach to fair division. Finally, we argue that even upon adopting the
claims approach, the fact that one does not have access to aggregative theories of
fairness is not something that should be considered problematic.
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Appendix
Theorem 1 (There are no non-trivial aggregative division rules)
Proof Let (E, N, c) be an arbitrary claims problem and let r be an aggregative
division rule. We will first establish the following claim:
(A) Let i 2 N be an agent for whichPj 6¼i cjE. Then riðE;N; cÞ ¼ 0, i.e. r allots
0 to such an agent i.
To do so, let i 2 N be an an agent for which Pj6¼i cjE. Let c0 be the claims
vector that is just like c except that ci ¼ 0 and let c00 be the claims vector that is just
like c except that cj ¼ 0 whenever j 6¼ i. Indeed, c ¼ c0 þ c00 from which it follows
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that ðE;N; cÞ ¼ ðE;N; c0Þ þ ð0;N; c00Þ. Note that in particular ðE;N; c0Þ satisfies the
definition of a claims problem: as
P
j 6¼i cjE we also have that
P
j c
0
jE. As r is an
aggregative division rule, we have riðE;N; cÞ ¼ riðE;N; c0Þ þ rið0;N; c00Þ ¼
0 þ 0 ¼ 0, which establishes (A). In order to establish our theorem, it suffices to
establish (B):
(B) Let (E, N, c) be a claims problem and let i 2 N be an arbitrary agent. Then
riðE;N; cÞ ¼ 0, i.e. r allots 0 to each agent i.
In order to establish (B), let cj be the claim of some agent other than i and let 0 be
a vector of n zeros. As r is aggregative, it follows that:
riðE;N; cÞ ¼ riðcj;N; cÞ þ riðE  cj;N; 0Þ ð7Þ
We have that riðE  cj;N; 0Þ ¼ 0 as agent i’s claim is zero in ðE  cj;N; 0Þ. Further,
as ðcj;N; cÞ is a claims problem in which the sum of claims of all agents other than i
is greater-than-or-equal to the estate, it follows from (A) that riðcj;N; cÞ ¼ 0 so that
it follows from (7) that riðE;N; cÞ ¼ 0. As i was arbitrary, r is trivial, which is what
we had to show. h
Theorem 2 Sh is aggregative: ShðN; vÞ þ ShðN; v0Þ ¼ ShðN; vþ v0Þ
Proof It follows from the definition of the Shapley value (4) that it suffices to show
that, for any order of agents p 2 PðNÞ:
MCvðpÞ þMCv0 ðpÞ ¼ MCvþv0 ðpÞ ð8Þ
Let p be an order and let its kth element be agent j: pk ¼ j. Let S be the coalition
consisting of all agents who arrive before j according to p, i.e. S ¼ fpm j m\kg. It
immediately follows from the definition of the vector of marginal contributions that
(i) MCvðpÞk ¼ vðS [ jÞ  vðSÞ, that (ii) MCv
0 ðpÞk ¼ v0ðS [ jÞ  v0ðSÞ and that (iii)
MCvþv
0 ðpÞk ¼ ðvþ v0ÞðS [ jÞ  ðvþ v0ÞðSÞ. Thus, by adding MCvðpÞk and MCv
0 ðpÞk
and rearranging terms, we get:
MCvðpÞk þMCv
0 ðpÞk ¼ vðS [ jÞ þ v0ðS [ jÞ  ðvðSÞ þ v0ðSÞÞ ð9Þ
Per definition of the aggregated game of v and v0 we have that ðvþ v0ÞðUÞ ¼
vðUÞ þ v0ðUÞ for any U  N. Hence, it follows from this definition that the right-
hand side of (9) is equal to ðvþ v0ÞðS [ jÞ  ðvþ v0ÞðSÞ. And hence it follows from
(9) and (iii) that MCvðpÞk þMCv
0 ðpÞk ¼ MCvþv
0 ðpÞk, so that (8) holds true, which is
what we had to show. h
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